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Exploring the Possibility of Using Independent Oversight to Determine Standards for Space Vehicles Who Will
Operate in the NAS
Tara Halt
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, USA, haltt@my.erau.edu
As the number of activities in space and near-space increase, both government and industry will need to consider
the best practice to maintain safe operations for their activities. The National Airspace in the United States is already
extremely complicated with over 5,000 flights taking off and landing daily. Standards and eventually some type of
certification will need to be developed for the launch vehicles in the commercial space industry. The implementation
of standards and certification will help to ensure that the spacecraft will not be a danger to the other vehicles
operating in the NAS. These standards would most likely be derived from a safety organization. By exploring the
standards and rules that have been developed by organizations in other industries, the commercial space industry can
efficiently and effectively create standards that will not compromise safety or hinder the growth of the industry.
I. BACKGROUND
Spaceflight has changed greatly since its inception in
the 1950s. Space was once the sole domain of the
United State and the Soviet Union, who were engaged
in an intense international competition for “space
supremacy” and national pride. Today, spaceflight has
evolved to encompass both other entities and a myriad
of other objectives. Instead of just two countries using
orbital and suborbital space (hereinafter “orbital
resources”), the entities vying for orbital resources
include more than a dozen countries and hundreds of
private corporations. This just includes parties with a
direct access to space; there are thousands of other
companies and organizations that interact indirectly
with space in a multitude of support roles. Additionally,
these other entities have extremely diverse objectives
including recreational manned flights; manned planet
and moon colonization; space station re-supply (both
manned and unmanned); planet, moon, and asteroid
mining; and satellite launching and repair, just to name
a few examples. As this evolution continues, it is
expected that the number of entities involved and the
diversity of goals will only increase. Additionally,
coordination between international governmental and
private enterprises is rudimentary at best.
This evolution has set the stage for a fairly chaotic
and arguably unsafe environment for commercial space
operations. This is evidenced by recent commercial and
governmental space launch failures, which included loss
of life. What is needed is a framework for international
governmental agencies and corporations to continue to
develop and implement their objectives, while providing
the public with assurances of safety. Preferably, this
system would include a system of incentives for safe
development of space resources. For example, one of
the incentives could be priority over other entities when
operating in the National Airspace.
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Space is filled with cutting edge, high-risk
technologies and scenarios. Due to its cutting edge
nature, spaceflight activities come with risks that may
include the possibility of a catastrophic failure.
However, spaceflight is only the most recent form of
transportation that has been developed. Other sectors of
transportation
including
railroad,
automobile,
aeronautical and maritime preceded the space industry.
There have been accidents in every type of
transportation and, as a result, each of the various
industries have always attempted to remedy their
mistakes by creating new organizations or committees
to regulate safety. Accordingly, the space sector can
learn a great deal from both its own mistakes and the
mistakes of other transportation sectors. The
aeronautical and maritime industries are particularly
useful guides because in both cases, people lives are
often placed in great danger if there is a catastrophic
failure en route to a destination.
Due to the continually evolving nature of the
worldwide commercial spaceflight industry, and the
diversity of the entities involved, space traffic
management is expected to present extreme challenges.
However, as with the development of the commercial
aviation industry, safety should be paramount in any
spaceflight traffic management scheme. It is proposed
herein to study and take advantage of the strides in
safety that other industries have achieved. The space
industry will use this knowledge to develop a
framework of safety regulations and processes that
incentivize the developing commercial space
transportation industry to implement safety best
practices, in order to receive priority in the space traffic
management schemes that are ultimately developed.
Accordingly, companies or countries that implement
best practices in safety will benefit from receiving
prioritized status in a spaceflight traffic management
scheme.
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This paper will provide an overview of the
successful implementation of safety regimens of other
transportation sectors, and how they can be utilized as
an international framework for incentivizing safety in
the commercial spaceflight industry by providing higher
priority in a space transportation management scheme.
II. GOVERNMENTAL, PRIVATE INDUSTRY OR
THIRD-PARTY FRAMEWORK
Governmental
bodies
(both
national
and
international) are often accurately accused of being
bureaucratic and slow to react. For example, in the
United States, new regulations often take four to six
years or longer until they officially become a part of the
federal registry. A slow, nonresponsive and reactionary
framework will not benefit the commercial space
transportation industry.
Leaving oversight to private industry, however,
presents its own challenges. Many companies put forth
the argument that they are clearly incentivized to ensure
that their systems will be safe because they would not
want to kill their own customers. While this is a valid
point when viewed on a macro-scale, a look at history
proves otherwise.
During the development of
components, systems or processes, companies are
making what are perceived as small, non-consequential
decisions; they tend to make compromise safety if the
cost savings are significant. This is a pattern in many
industries that are related or unrelated to transportation.
For example, for offshore drilling platforms, large and
small companies in the oil and gas industry been known
to make shortcuts in certain safety areas in order to
increase their profit margins. Accordingly, relying upon
industry to “do the right thing” will likely not result in a
migration toward safer practices.
An independent safety organization could be an
ideal compromise between the bureaucratic and
complicated government and the ambitious and
sometimes short-sighted nature of the commercial space
industry. Collaboration between the government,
companies, and an independent safety organization
would decrease the chance that a potential risk would go
unnoticed.
III. BEST PRACTICES OF OTHER INDUSTRIES
A. ACCIDENT THEORIES
Safety experts have two schools of thought in
regards to safety: 1) Normal Accident Theory and 2)
High Reliability Theory. These theories can be essential
when trying to decide what the scope and focus of an
independent or dependent regulatory agency should be.
Normal Accident Theory is a concept that originates in
Charles Perrow’s book, “Normal Accidents: Living with
High-Risk Technologies”. Normal Accident Theory
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emphasizes that technological and organizational
complexities contribute to failures (Greenfield).
Accidents are often inevitable in highly complex
systems. This is why normal accidents can also be
referred to as “inevitable accidents (Perrow).” Normal
Accident Theory focuses on systems approaches and
system thinking. Incidents or “close calls” can often
give a company or organization insight into how all the
systems are inter-related (Greenfield). In order to
prevent normal accidents, companies need to understand
all the details and complexities of their program and
systems (Perrow). They must also analyse close calls
and mishaps to determine root causes. The company
should then use all this knowledge to improve future
programs and operations.
High Reliability Theory was developed by a group
of researchers at the University of California, Berkeley.
This team was tasked with examining aircraft carriers,
the FAA’s air traffic control system and nuclear power
operations (Greenfield). High Reliability Theory
believes that if a high-risk technology is properly
designed and managed, then the system should be
robust enough to account for human errors and avoid
situations that would lead to catastrophic failures
(Columbia). This theory looks at a program or a system
from the bottom up. The premise is that if each
individual component is sufficiently reviewed and
determined to be highly reliable, then the overall system
will be highly reliable and safe. There two theories were
used to help support the conclusions that the Columbia
Accident Investigation made after the tragic Space
Shuttle accident in 2003 (Columbia).
If an organization were to focus on normal accident
theory, then that organization would require a highly
technical team that would be able to understand all the
complexities of a spacecraft and its system. While the
organization would believe that accidents are inevitable,
the culture would be focused on learning from close
calls and mishaps to minimize the probability that an
event would occur or the damage that it could create.
Normal accident theory is often describes as a “top
down approach (Perrow).” On the other hand, the
independent organization could also decide to accept the
high reliability theory which would involve a lot of
testing and research in order to determine if a system is
safe and reliable. Since high reliability theory focuses
on each component, it is often referred to as a “bottom
up approach (Columbia).” An organization that
implements both approaches, both top-down and
bottom-up reviews of their systems and processes,
would receive extra points toward a point-based
prioritized status in a space traffic management scheme.
The number of points that a company has would
determine their level of prioritization in this model. A
higher level would give a company a higher priority
status in a space traffic management scheme.
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B. NAVAL REACTOR SAFETY PROGRAMS
The Navy Submarine Force was mentioned in the
Columbia Accident Investigation Report as a good
example of an adaptive and effective safety program.
The Naval Reactor Program has been particularly
successful with 5,500 reactor years of experience
without an accident (Columbia). SUBSAFE, the navy’s
non-nuclear safety program, is also an excellent model
which can help guide other industries and organization
through the development of their own safety programs.
NASA, following a recommendation from the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board, has established a
dialogue with the Navy to learn more about their
programs and what elements make its safety program so
successful (Columbia). A successful program is based
on key principles such as:
• Communication and Action
• Recurring Training and Learning from mistakes
• Encouraging Minority Opinions
• Retaining Knowledge
• Worst-Case Event Failures (Columbia)
For proper communication and action, an
organization should maintain a program with clear
checks and balances. All of the involved parties within
the organization should know their responsibilities, and
how they fit within the overall organization.
The second element that is highly valued in the
Navy Submarine Force is training and learning from
mistakes. All personnel involved in the Navy Reactor
program have received stringent training and have been
thoroughly educated on accidents in other sectors
outside the marine world such as NASA’s Challenger
accident. A view of these outside incidents would
provide a good basis for understanding the nature and
cause of accidents, and how to avoid them. In essence,
the companies would be learning from the mistakes of
others.
Commercial space companies should also try to
encourage minority opinions like the Navy to make sure
that safety issues are not ignored simply because it is an
unpopular opinion. Some employees may feel that they
should keep their concerns to themselves. It is important
to express these concerns because it may save people’s
lives in the future. There should be a way that people
can express their doubts and concerns without the fear
that it will impact their employment status. Minority
opinions are important because it helps to ensure that all
potential problems have been identified.
The ability to retain knowledge would help a
company focus on its guiding principles and keep track
of its overall goals when facing obstacles and making
important decisions. Employees should have at least a
basic understanding of all systems on a satellite or
spacecraft even if it is not their area of expertise.
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While it can be unpleasant or demotivating to think
about, all companies should prepare for the worst-case
scenario and be fully aware of all the consequences that
could stem from a catastrophic failure. These principles
should be the focus of any independent oversight
organization that is charged with keeping spaceflight
safe.
IV. UNITED NATIONS SPECIALIZED
AGENCIES
The United Nations has a plurality of related
organizations that can act as a guide for the
implementation of any future space organization.
The International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) is a specialized UN Agency that develops
international Standards and Recommended Practices
(SARPs) that countries can reference when creating
their own laws in the aviation industry. Their overall
vision is to “achieve the sustainable growth of the
global civil aviation system (About ICAO).” Almost all
countries are member states of ICAO. With over
100,000 flights operating daily in the air transport
network, it is essential that there is overall acceptance of
the SARPs that are created by ICAO (About ICAO).
The International Maritime Organization is
very similar model to ICAO, but for the maritime
industry. The IMO is the “global standard-setting
authority for the safety, security and environmental
performance of international shipping. Its main role is to
create a regulatory framework for the shipping industry
that is fair and effective, universally adopted and
universally implemented (About IMO).” The
International Maritime Organization work is focused on
the environment, collaboration between countries, legal
issues, security, and safety.
There has been some discussion among experts
about creating an organization similar to ICAO and
IMO for the space industry, but so far there has been no
significant progress in that area (Taking a page). The
United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs
(UNOOSA) is the best example of international
leadership that the space industry currently has.
UNOOSA works to “promote international cooperation
in the peaceful use and exploration of space, and in the
utilization of space science and technology for
sustainable economic and social development (About
UNOOSA).” UNOOSA has helped to develop five
treaties and five sets of principles that are supposed to
guide the activities of outer space. It remains unclear if
UNOOSA would be capable of any disciplinary action
if those treaties were to be broken. One of the primary
issues with the treaties that UNOOSA created is that
some of them have not been ratified by the primary
space faring nations, for example, Russia, China, and
the United States (About UNOOSA).
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UNOOSA and ICAO have tried to start
preparing for the future by creating a portal on both
websites where interested parties can upload documents
and start a dialogue (About ICAO). Points of contact are
also included on the portal as an attempt to facilitate
collaboration from all interested parties. Some of the
more prominent organizations that have been included
are NASA, Canadian Space Agency, DLR, FAA, and
the International Association for the Advancement of
Space Safety (IAASS). The main challenge for
UNOOSA and ICAO in regards to space is the all the
uncertainty. It is difficult to determine at this time the
type of guidance that the space sector will need from an
international organization. While it is important to have
dialogue at an international level, the United States
should establish its own oversight models first since
many countries look to the United States as the prime
example when developing their own organizations and
regulations.
V. CLASSIFICATION SOCIETIES
Besides IMO, the marine sector also relies on the
expertise found in its classification societies. In fact, the
International Association of Classification Societies
(ICAS) provides the technical support for the
International Maritime Organization (About IMO). The
fact that the IMO uses ICAS as its technical support
shows how well respected classification societies are in
the marine sector. ICAS consist of 12 maritime
classification societies. These societies are “impartial
organizations consisting of technical experts that have
established a system of public safety based on private
law contracts. They are often described as the unofficial
‘policemen’ in the marine world (Classification).”
Merchants and ship owners developed classification
Societies in the 1800s (Llyod’s). The captains and
owners would share the risks and rewards of a voyage
by a process that is referred to today as underwriting
(Classification). The involved parties needed a way to
assess the quality of the ship before they would feel
confident moving forward with the underwriting
process. This is where the concept of classification
societies began and has been a vital part of the maritime
industry ever since.
A classification society sets standards for the design,
construction, and maintenance of maritime vessels.
According to the ICAS website, the rules and standards
set by the 12 members of ICAS encompass “More than
90% of the world's cargo carrying tonnage (Llyods’s).”
Certification is often done by these societies for a fee.
For ship owners, it is worth the time and money to get
certified because often insurers will not insure the ships
without certification from those societies. In the marine
sector, classification societies have reached a high level
of credibility and prominence. An important aspect of
classification societies is that they are independent, self-
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regulating, and externally audited (Classification).
These societies have no commercial interests in the
areas of ship design, manufacturing etc.… Therefore, It
would be very unlikely that a classification society
would place more value on profit rather than safe
practices.
Commercial Space could most likely adopt a similar
system with the same success. In commercial space, a
classification society could do similar activities and
services that it does for the marine sector such as
developing standards and certifying vehicles. With an
established certification and standards process,
companies would know what is required even before
they begin the design phase. This would reduce the need
to issue waivers that could potentially compromise the
overall safety of the system. With an independent body
giving its stamp of approval, a commercial company
could apply for a license from the FAA with more
confidence. A certification from an independent body
could be thought in the same light as a more in depth
safety approval, a process that is currently done by the
FAA for safety elements such as training or an
identified safety component.
VI. AEROSPACE CORPORATION
While an international organization may be
necessary in the future, the US would also benefit from
having an independent safety organization domestically.
Launches are always risky but that risk of failure can be
decreased when an independent organization is
involved. One the best and most relevant examples of
an independent safety organization is the relationship
between The Aerospace Corporation and the Air Force.
The Aerospace Corporation is a non-profit organization
and a Federally Funded Research and Development
Center (FFRDC). The Department of Defense identified
the main areas that The Aerospace Corporation focuses
on since it is a FFRDC. These elements are launch
certification, system-of-systems engineering, systems
development and acquisition, process implementation,
and technology application (Columbia). The Aerospace
Corporation independent launch verification process has
proven to be quite effective. The Air Force “only has a
2.9 percent probability of failure rate in comparison to
the commercial sector which is 14.6 percent
(Columbia).” Before a launch, The Aerospace
Corporation sends a letter to the Air Force that states
that the vehicle has been independently verified as ready
for launch. The staff of the Aerospace Corporation has a
very thorough review process that goes through every
aspect of launch from payload integration to the
adequacy of flight and ground hardware (Columbia). As
a result, the Air Force can launch their payloads with
increased confidence. More than two thirds of the
people that are employed at The Aerospace Corporation
have highly technical backgrounds (Sgobba). These
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people are the experts in their respective fields, which
make them great assets when they are hired as
consultants to other commercial space companies. The
Aerospace Corporation employees are able to
understand the complexities a space vehicle’s
components and consequences of system failures. The
Aerospace Corporation embodies that idea that a safety
certification should be even more knowledge and
experienced than the design team of a launch vehicle
(Sgobba).
VII.RELEVANCE TO SPACE TRAFFIC
MANAGEMENT
Analysing the safety requirements of other
organizations is an important step when trying to
determine how space traffic will be integrated into the
National Airspace system. When spacecraft are
operating, it is acknowledged that they will be flying
over other countries; possibly even in that country’s
airspace. This paper focuses on the National Airspace
System in the United States for the purposes of
simplicity. A spacecraft should not endanger other
aircraft especially since aircraft are more vulnerable to
debris than buildings on the ground. A breakup of a
spacecraft can cover a very large area. In October 2014,
Virgin Galactic and Scaled Composites’ SpaceShipTwo
broke up during its 4th powered test flight. The debris
from the incident was mainly spread over a 5-mile area
but there were some pieces found as far as 35 miles
(SpaceShipTwo). No company can say with absolute
certainty where debris would land in the event of a
catastrophic failure. Inflight breakdown is an important
consideration for suborbital flights since many designs
that are in development consists of a vehicle that will be
flown like an airplane or a glider during take-off or
landing. Suborbital vehicles will spend a lot more time
in the National Airspace System than a traditional
orbital launch vehicle that only operates for brief
periods of time. Airlines will not be very cooperative if
they have to always reroute their flights to
accommodate space traffic. During the Space Shuttle
days, airlines usually were very cooperative when
NASA wanted to launch but this pattern of
accommodation is not expected to continue for
commercial space companies. With both air and space
companies looking to make a profit, no one wants to
have to delay their flight or launch because of another
company.
Airline regulations are often referred to as
“blood laws.” The basis of many regulations comes
from a fatal accident. The fatal inflight collision
between TWA Flight 2 and United Airlines Flight 718
near the Grand Canyon motivated the government to
upgrade the air traffic control system and create the
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Federal Aviation Agency (Administration) to oversee
aviation safety in the United States (FAA History).
After the fatal fire aboard Air Canada 797 killed 23
people, the Federal Aviation Administration made new
regulations in response (FAA History). Since the fire
started in lavatory, the first regulation required that all
airplane lavatories are equipped with smoke detectors.
The FAA also implemented regulations that required
that seats be fitted with a flame resistant layer and
adequate floor lighting should be provided for
passengers (FAA History). It seems a bit morbid to
continue this practice where regulations are only
developed after human lives are lost. Currently the FAA
Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) has
moratorium on creating regulations for crew and
spaceflight participants. The moratorium is expected to
be extended by the Senate until at least 2020. The
House of Representatives has discussed extending it
even further until 2025 (Messier).
If the government is unable to create
regulations, for occupants, standards for space vehicles
should be developed by an independent body. The FAA
AST office focuses on licensing activities but they do
not license vehicles. In fact, the NTSB investigation of
the SpaceShipTwo crash revealed that most companies
do not even approach the government until after their
vehicle is already developed (SpaceShipTwo). This
being the case, there should be an independent body
such as a classification society that can certify that the
vehicle will not cause a disruption to the complicated
national airspace system.
Currently, commercial
aircraft require an extensive certification and inspection.
While the commercial space industry may not be ready
for a similar stringent process, there needs to be more
guidance to manufacturers than what is currently
offered. Standards could help companies design their
vehicles so that they can receive license from the FAA
more quickly and avoid the potential high costs of
having to redesign a vehicle close to a planned launch
date. Customers who want to launch payloads will want
the vehicles they are riding on to be dependent and have
a reasonable chance of mission success. Thus far, no
paying customers have been flown on a commercial
launch vehicle. It seems unreasonable to allow these
unproven vehicles to operate in the National Airspace
without some type of standards from a trusted safety
organization.
Standards and other recommended practices
could be used as the basis for a prioritization model. In
the model, companies that comply with the standards
would be given priority over those who do not. For
example, if two companies are vying for the same
launch date, priority would be given to the company that
follows the standards set by the independent safety
organization. The safer the vehicle is, the higher the
priority they will receive. There could be various levels
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within this scheme. A company’s prioritization level
would be determined by the number of points a
company has. For example, a company would receive
more points if they analysed their systems with the both
top down and bottom approaches that were mentioned
earlier in this paper. There are some issues that would
need to be resolved in order for this model to be both
effective and efficient. The main issue is how to
compare suborbital and orbital vehicles since there are
many differences between spacecraft that operate in
space or near space.
VIII. CONCLUSION
An independent oversight organization that was a
combination of the classification society model and The
Aerospace Corporation model could help the
commercial space industry grow and maintain a high
level of safe operations. Oversight of the commercial
space industry should not be prescriptive. It is much
more beneficial to all involved parties to focus on safety
cases rather than explicit design requirements. It is
important to note that even with these independent
agencies having some oversight it would still be
necessary to have spaceport and launches licensed by
the FAA. For example, at a launch The Aerospace
Corporation could verify that a vehicle is ready for
launch, while an FAA Inspector could ensure that the
safety of the uninvolved public. This would create an
effective system of checks and balances that minimize
the chance that a safety issue was overlooked.
The prioritization model presented in this paper
would be an excellent incentive for the industry. Those
who do not meet the standards would be less likely to
receive their desired launch date if there are conflicts
with other companies. It will be challenging to integrate
spacecraft with the National Airspace System but the
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technology innovations that will be developed as a
result could make the National Airspace System even
more efficient than it is currently.
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